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Abstract 
Despite indications that inequality can have a large impact on development, little research on 
the relationship between foreign aid and inequality exists. The majority of the studies on the 
subject also focus on overall aid figures, thereby leaving the question of whether the purpose 
of aid matters unexplored. This study uses panel data on 116 countries over the time period 
1972-2011 to focus on whether aid affects inequality, and in particular whether the effect in 
that case depends on the type of aid. Aid is therefore separated into four statistically valid 
categories: economic, social, reconstructional and residual. The results indicate that a 
relationship exists between all four categories of aid and inequality, and that the purpose of 
aid does matter. Economic and social aid show a positive relationship to inequality, while 
reconstructional and residual aid display a negative one.  
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1. Introduction 
In recent years, increased attention has been paid to the importance of aid efficiency. The 
Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005), the Accra Agenda for Action (2008), and the 
Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (2011) (OECD 2012; OECD n.d.e) 
reflect a growing interest in the topic among donor countries. The trend can be noticed also 
among economists. Although interest in aid efficiency has been widespread within the 
economic field since the 1970's (Hansen & Tarp 2000), there seems to have been renewed 
focus on the topic after a recent study by Burnside and Dollar (2000) showed that aid has a 
positive effect on growth in the presence of good policies. The increased attention on the 
necessity of using aid money effectively is greatly needed. Despite the long history of foreign 
aid, around 1.3 billion people still live in absolute poverty1 (World Bank 2012).  
 Economic research on aid efficiency is largely focused on aid's effect on growth. The 
basic theoretical foundation is the assumption that aid adds to the national savings, thereby 
increasing investment and growth and eventually also reducing poverty (Schabbel 2007, p.9). 
However, despite the theoretical predictions and the wide influence of Burnside and Dollar's 
(2000) study, the existence of a positive relationship between aid and growth has been 
strongly challenged. Over the years, researchers have produced a large number of studies with 
mixed answers to the question of whether aid has an impact on growth (e.g. Dalgaard et al. 
2004; Karras 2006; Ekanayake & Chatrna 2010). Based on their meta-studies of all existing 
research, Doucouliagos and Paldam (2008; 2010; 2011) argue that there now is convincing 
evidence that aid has no effect on growth, even when conditioning on other commonly used 
factors (good policy and aid itself).2  
 Increasing the growth rate is generally also considered the principal way in which aid 
can decrease poverty. Economic growth is either assumed to cause a ”trickle-down” effect 
where the benefits of growth accruing to the rich eventually also spread to the poor, or to 
cause a direct increase in income for everyone in society (Schabbel 2007, pp.201-203). 
Empirical research generally gives support to the hypothesis that growth at least to some 
extent benefits the poor (e.g. Dollar & Kraay 2002; Perera & Lee 2013). However, the results 
from Doucouliagos and Paldam's research (2008; 2010; 2011), which indicate that aid has no 
effect on growth, cast doubt on whether aid can actually affect poverty through this channel. 
 One aspect has, however, largely been overlooked. Despite a close relationship 
                                                          
1 2008 figures; defined as living on less than $1.25 per day at 2005 purchasing power parity. 
2 In their last study, Doucouliagos & Paldam (2011) note a possible positive relationship between some types of 
aid and growth, although their small sample size makes it impossible to draw any reliable conclusions. 
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between growth, poverty and income inequality, relatively little research has looked at aid's 
effect on inequality. The lack of research in the area is especially surprising given indications 
that income inequality can have a negative impact on growth (e.g. Alesina & Rodrik 1994; 
Chambers & Krause 2010).3 Many countries are also unlikely to be able to achieve the high 
levels of growth that are predicted to be needed to reduce poverty, so a reduction in inequality 
is a necessary complement (Lensink & White 2000). Finding out whether foreign aid affects 
income inequality is of critical importance in these contexts.  
 The recent research on aid and growth has also increased the need for more 
investigations of the relationship between aid and inequality. The mounting evidence on aid's 
inability to affect growth could potentially be misleading due to the use of overall growth 
figures. If aid affects growth positively in sectors that benefit the poor while growth in sectors 
benefitting the rich is reduced, aid could have no effects on overall growth despite having the 
intended effects on poverty reduction. Research on inequality is therefore a necessary 
complement to studies on aid and growth. 
 Inequality can also have an effect on the development process that goes beyond the 
strictly economic. Research indicates that high inequality is considered unfair by a majority of 
people, and increases the risk for social problems and instability (Rawls 1971 in Todaro & 
Smith 2011, p.221; Todaro & Smith 2011, p.220). In an unstable and problem-ridden society, 
increased uncertainty and risk can slow development down. In its most destructive form, 
social instability can also cause material and institutional damage that reverse progress. A 
very unequal income distribution can therefore be a threat to both future development and any 
progress achieved. Aid's impact on inequality is therefore relevant also in this aspect. 
 Research on aid's effect on inequality is, in other words, necessary both due to the 
destructive consequences of inequality as well as its potential effect on growth and poverty. 
However, the available research on aid and inequality provides little insight into the nature of 
the relationship. The studies that have been conducted this far have found an almost equal 
share of positive or negative effects, or no effects at all (e.g. Cuesta et al. 2006; Chong et al. 
2009; Herzer & Nunnenkamp 2012). Attempts to separate aid into different categories have 
been few and can therefore provide no definitive answer to whether certain types of aid 
affects inequality (Saidon et al. 2013; Tezanos et al. 2013). Consequently, it is still unclear 
whether aid has an impact on inequality. More research on the subject is therefore needed. 
                                                          
3 While many studies find a negative relationship, a number of studies are unable to find any clear relationship, 
or only find one conditional on other factors (e.g. Shin 2012; Bleaney 2004; Bjørnskov 2008; Persson & 
Tabellini 1994). A consensus on the effect of income inequality on growth is therefore not yet established. 
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 This study aims to add to the existing research by investigating whether different types 
of foreign aid have any impact on income inequality in developing countries. The contribution 
is thereby twofold: first, the study adds to the scarce knowledge on aid's effect on income 
distribution, and second, the study complements the existing literature on the effects of 
different types of aid by using a statistically valid categorization of aid that has not previously 
been used in the field. In the study, a cross section and period fixed effects (FE) as well as a 
cross section random effects (RE) regression are run on an unbalanced panel of 116 countries 
over the years 1972-2011. The Gini coefficient is the dependent variable while aid separated 
into four statistically valid categories, together with a set of control variables, are used as the 
explanatory variables. The regression results show that a relationship to inequality exists for 
all four types of aid. For economic and social aid the relationship is positive, while 
reconstructional and residual aid exhibit a negative relationship. 
 In the next section (2), definitions and measures of aid and inequality are examined, 
and in the section following that (3), previous research on the subject will be reviewed. In 
section 4, the theoretical framework will be discussed, and in section 5 the model that will be 
used in the study is presented. Section 6 provides an overview of the data selection, followed 
by a discussion of the methodology in section 7. Finally, section 8 discusses the results and 
section 9 contains a summary of the study findings.  
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2. Definitions 
 
2.1 Foreign aid 
In its broadest sense, foreign aid can be said to be a transfer of funds by multilateral and 
bilateral donors, or by private non-governmental organizations (NGO's), in an effort to 
promote development in poor countries (Todaro & Smith 2011, p.698). However, in official 
statistics focus lies on public aid so NGO transfers are usually excluded (Todaro & Smith 
2011, p.698). To be defined as aid the purpose of the transfer must also not be commercial, 
and any loans must be concessional; in other words, interest rate and repayment period must 
be less burdensome than for loans offered on the regular market (Todaro & Smith 2011, 
p.698). As a rule, aid for military purposes is also not counted in official aid measures 
(Todaro & Smith 2011, p.698). For an accurate account of the level of help that developing 
countries receive, less obvious transfers of funds such as preferential tariffs and technical 
assistance costs should be counted as aid, but in reality not all of them are (Todaro & Smith 
2011, p.698).  
 Today, around 95 percent of all aid comes from the 28 countries that are members of 
The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development's (OECD's) Development 
Assistance Committee (DAC) (Tarp 2008; OECD n.d.d). The influence of the DAC is also 
evident by the widespread use of its aid measures in both research and by international 
organizations such as the United Nations (UN). The Official Development Assistance (ODA) 
measure has been produced since the 1960's and is the most widely used measure for 
evaluations of aid flows (OECD n.d.a). ODA encompasses both loans and grants given to the 
government of a developing country (Tarp 2008). In addition to having to come from a 
multilateral or bilateral donor and having a development objective, a transfer must consist of 
at least 25 percent grants to be considered ODA (OECD n.d.a). Aid can also be considered 
ODA only if it goes to a country listed as one of the traditional aid recipients; aid that goes to 
other countries, such as those in Eastern Europe, is classified as Official Aid (Tarp 2008).  
 Measured in constant prices, the trend has been for total ODA to grow over the years, 
and after a smaller dip during the recent recession, aid is again increasing and reached its 
highest figure ever in 2011 (see Figure 1) (OECD n.d.f). However, the decrease in aid during 
the recent recession illustrates how sensitive aid is to donors' financial situation and priorities. 
Changes in the amount of aid that a country receives from a donor, so called aid volatility, is 
hypothesized to cause a number of negative effects in recipient countries (Tengstam 2013).  
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 In an attempt to more accurately capture the flow of aid that actually reaches the 
developing countries, the DAC now also produces the Country Programmable Aid (CPA) 
statistic (Benn et al. 2010). This measure is a subset of the ODA and excludes aid that is 
unpredictable (e.g. humanitarian aid) or not covered in agreements between donor and 
recipient (e.g. aid through other agencies), as well as aid that is used in ways that means that it 
does not materialize as funds in the recipient’s accounts (e.g. administrative costs) (Benn et al. 
2010). In contrast to ODA, CPA also does not subtract loan repayments (OECD 2008; Benn 
et al. 2010). Research shows that CPA provides a good estimate of the quantity of aid that 
reaches developing countries, which generally amounts to around half of a DAC member's 
gross ODA (Benn et al. 2010). The CPA also provides figures on the sectoral allocation of 
aid; an overview of the current allocation can be found in Figure 2.  
Source: Authors own graph based on OECD 
data (OECD n.d.b). 
(1) Includes forestry, fishing, industry, mining, 
construction, trade policy and tourism 
Source: Authors own calculations based on OECD 
data (OECD n.d.c). 
Figure 2. Aid allocation 2011 
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2.2 Inequality 
From an economic perspective, inequality can be defined as the disproportionate ”distribution 
of economic stocks or flows among economic agents” (A Dictionary of Economics 2009). 
Measures of inequality among a country's population can therefore be based on a number of 
factors, such as wealth, land, or other assets. In recent decades, an increasing number of 
economists have also argued that multidimensional measures are needed to fully capture the 
extent of inequality (Nilsson 2007). However, although multidimensional, asset based, and 
other flow-based inequality measures can be informative, focus within the economic field is 
generally on measures of income inequality (Brandolini & Smeeding 2008).4 
 A number of methods can be used to measure income inequality. The most 
straightforward way to look at this type of inequality is to divide the population into quintiles 
(or deciles) based on each person's income, and compare the proportion of the income that 
goes to the different quintiles (deciles) (Todaro & Smith 2011, pp.204-205). More complex 
inequality measures includes the class of generalized entropy (GE) measures, which provides 
a greater amount of detail on the nature of inequality, such as information on to what extent 
an overall change in inequality is due to changes in between-groups or within-group 
inequality (Haughton & Khandker 2009, pp.111-112). Another such class of measures of 
higher complexity is Atkinson's, which makes it possible to produce inequality measurements 
that are sensitive to the opposition to inequality (Haughton & Khandker 2009, p.107).  
  The most common measure of inequality is, however, the Gini coefficient. The 
measure is based on the Lorenz curve, which displays a country's distribution of income 
during a certain time period, using cumulative income percentages on the vertical axis and 
cumulative population percentages on the horizontal axis (Todaro & Smith 2011, p.206-207). 
Consequently, the wider the space between a country's Lorenz curve and the diagonal curve 
tracing out complete equality, the larger the inequality in said country. The Gini coefficient is 
calculated by taking the ratio of the area between the two curves to the total area under the 
complete equality curve (Todaro & Smith 2011, p.208). The Gini coefficient's values 
therefore range from 0 to 1 (sometimes adjusted to 0 to 100), where 0 implies complete 
equality and 1 (or 100) implies complete inequality (Todaro & Smith 2011, p.208). In 
countries with relative equality, the Gini coefficient is found somewhere between 0.2 and 
0.35, while countries with a Gini coefficient over 0.5 are considered high inequality countries 
                                                          
4 Since this study uses an inequality measure based on income, the rest of the text in this section will focus on 
this type of inequality. However, the different income inequality measures discussed in this passage can also 
be used to measure inequality based on other factors. 
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(Todaro & Smith 2011, p.208).  
 Although the Gini coefficient meets many of the desired properties of an inequality 
measure, there are also some disadvantages with the measure (Todaro & Smith 2011, p.209). 
Two different distributions with Lorenz curves which cross can theoretically have the same 
Gini coefficient, despite representing two different situations (Todaro & Smith 2011, p.210). 
In contrast to the GE measures, it is also not possible to disaggregate or add up Gini 
coefficients of different subgroups, and the coefficient does not allow for easy testing of the 
significance of any changes (Haughton & Khandker 2009, p.106). 
 Calculations of inequality measures can be based on a number of different income 
definitions. Definitions can differ in the types of incomes that are included, the length of the 
time period for which data is collected, and whether gross or net figures are used (Brandolini 
& Smeeding 2008). In developing countries, consumption figures are sometimes also used as 
a substitute for income due to the difficulty of determining incomes, especially among the 
poor population (Deaton 1989; Srinivasan & Park 2000; Brandolini & Smeeding 2008). Since 
different definitions produce distinct income figures, calculations of income inequality must 
be based on data using the same income definition if the measurements are to be comparable. 
 Measures of income inequality are also sensitive to the treatment of the income data. 
Income can be calculated for different reference units, such as households or individuals 
(Brandolini & Smeeding 2008). In addition, there are several different equivalence scales, or 
ways to adjust the data when calculating the income of a certain reference unit, to take into 
consideration the way household size and composition affect the income that goes to each 
individual as well as the monetary needs of that individual (Brandolini & Smeeding 2008; 
United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research n.d.). To 
ensure that inequality measurements can be compared, income data that have all been 
adjusted in the same way must be used when calculating the inequality measure.  
 There is abundant evidence for the need to accurately capture and study inequality.  
One of the negative consequences of inequality is a potential reduction of growth. Although 
disputed by some researchers, many studies find that income inequality has a negative impact 
on growth (e.g. Alesina & Rodrik 1994; Chambers & Krause 2010; Vu & Mukhopadhaya 
2011; see for example Bleaney & Nishiyama 2004; Bjørnskov 2008 for somewhat conflicting 
views). Several inefficiencies caused by inequality have been documented and provide a 
possible explanation to how growth could be affected by inequality. The observed 
inefficiencies include the effects of unequal asset distribution, reduced borrowing, rent 
seeking and decreased national savings rates.  
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 Unequal ownership of assets such as education or land can be a consequence of 
income inequality, and has been shown to be inefficient (Todaro & Smith 2011, p.220). High 
inequality also creates inefficiencies by reducing the poorer population's possibilities to 
borrow money (Todaro & Smith 2011, p.220). When the poor are unable to get loans, they are 
also unable to invest sufficient capital in their businesses and in education for their children 
(Todaro & Smith 2011, p.220). The result is a lower number of growing firms that can create 
jobs and economic development, and a loss of productivity in future workers. Unequal asset 
distribution and reduced capacity for borrowing among the poor can therefore create 
inefficiencies that restrict economic growth. 
 Further inefficiencies are caused by rent seeking. In highly unequal societies, the 
wealthy have the ability to spend resources on maintaining their privileged situation (Todaro 
& Smith 2011, p.220). As a result, rent seeking is more common in such societies (Todaro & 
Smith 2011, p.220). From an economic point of view, rent seeking is inefficient since it 
causes resources to be spent on unproductive activities (Stone 2008, p.225). Consequently, 
rent seeking detracts resources from productive purposes and can reduce growth.  
 High inequality also causes inefficiencies related to reduced national savings rates 
(Todaro & Smith 2011, p. 220). Since the wealthy tend to place their money abroad or spend 
it on foreign luxury items, savings rates among the rich are in fact lower than in the mid and 
low income brackets (Todaro & Smith 2011, p.220). High inequality therefore reduces a 
country's savings, and thereby decreases the productive investments (Todaro & Smith 2011, 
p.220). Although today's dominating neoclassical growth models generally consider savings 
and investments to be related to the level of the steady state rather than the growth rate, low 
savings and investment rates prevent a country both from going through the growth period 
needed to reach a higher steady state, and from staying at this level (Burda & Wyplosz 2013, 
pp.64-66). Hence, high inequality can cause inefficiencies that affect a country's short-term 
growth rate as well as its standard of living (Burda & Wyplosz 2013, pp.64-66). 
 High income inequality does not only cause economic inefficiencies and potentially 
reduced growth; in addition to the directly economic effects, a number of social problems are 
associated with inequality. Empirical research shows that violent crime rates are higher in 
countries where inequality is high (Hsieh & Pugh 1993; Fajnzylber et al. 2002). Countries 
with high income inequality also suffer lower life expectancy and worse health than similar 
countries with less inequality, also when the effects from material deprivation are controlled 
for (see Wilkinson & Pickett 2006 for a review). The reductions in freedom and capabilities 
that result from these social problems have the potential to stifle both growth and more 
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general development. 
 High inequality also increases the risk of social instability and its potentially disastrous 
economic effects (Todaro & Smith 2011, p. 220). Inequality increases the political power of 
the wealthy, making social reforms that benefit the majority of the population, but have 
negative effects on the elite, more difficult to get through (Todaro & Smith 2011, p. 220). As 
a consequence, the risk of populism gaining influence among the poor increases (Todaro & 
Smith 2011, p. 220). Experiments conducted by Rawls (1971 cited in Todaro & Smith 2011, 
p. 221) also show that most people consider some inequality necessary to incentivize good 
behavior, but deem current levels of income inequality too high. Social unrest caused by 
rising populism or by general frustration with the level of inequality could slow down 
development, or in more violent and materially destructive cases, even reverse progress.   
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3. Literature review 
Research on the relationship between aid and within-country inequality is remarkably limited. 
The existing studies also present surprisingly contradictory results, so a conclusion on the 
direction of the effect, or as to whether an effect exists at all, has not yet been obtained (see 
Appendix B.2. for an overview). 
  Out of the existing research, two studies fail to demonstrate that an effect exists. 
Chong et al. (2009) use the generalized method of moments (GMM) technique on data for 
116 countries for the years 1971-2002 to test whether aid has an impact on income inequality 
but find no statistically significant effect. When taking the quality of a country's institutions 
into account the results do show that aid reduces inequality, but this effect fails to be robust. 
Also Layton and Nielson (2008) fail to find a robust relationship in their study on 82 countries 
over the years 1975-2005. They run ordinary least squares (OLS) and two stage least square 
(2SLS) regressions on panel data and find that aid has a positive effect on income inequality 
in many cases, but the effect is often not statistically significant and not stable to changes in 
the assumptions of the model. 
 A few studies find robust and statistically significant positive relationships between 
aid and inequality. Bjørnskov (2010) uses a random effects weighted least squares (WLS) 
technique on 88 countries over the years 1960-2000 to investigate the effect of ODA and 
democracy on the income distribution. The results show a positive association and potential 
causality between aid and inequality in democracies, but the effect is missing in non-
democratic settings. Herzer and Nunnenkamp (2012) instead employ a bivariate model and 
panel cointegration techniques on data from 21 countries over the period 1970-1995 and find 
that the long-run effect of aid on income inequality is positive. 
 In contrast, a number of studies show that aid has a negative effect on income 
inequality. Cuesta et al. (2006) use an ordered probit model to investigate income inequality 
in 30 countries over the years 1995-1998. The result shows that aid generally reduces 
inequality if it is given during a longer time period, but there are regional differences in the 
strength of the effect. Shafiullah (2011) runs random and fixed effects regressions on a panel 
of 88 countries over the period 1989-2008 and finds that the growth rate of aid has a negative 
effect on inequality. However, when looking at a subsample of only South Asian countries, 
the effect is unclear. Tezanos et al. (2013) restrict their sample to Latin American and 
Caribbean countries. In contrast to the other studies, their research is based on growth theory 
and looks at the growth rate of GDP per capita of the population in the poorest decile 
compared to the general per capita growth rate. A generalized method of moments (GMM) is 
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used on panel data for 20 countries for the period 1992-2007, and the results show that aid has 
a proportionately bigger positive impact in the investigated decile. When separating ODA into 
grants and loans, the tests show that both types of aid cause inequality-reducing growth, but 
ODA loans have a larger effect. Saidon et al. (2013) instead separate ODA into social, 
economic, production, and multi-sectoral aid based on the OECD/DAC classification. The 
study uses the generalized method of moments (GMM) on panel data for 75 countries for the 
years 1995-2009. The results show that only aid to the economic sector and the multi-sector 
have statistically significant effects, with the former having a negative impact on inequality, 
while the latter has a positive impact. For aid to the social sector and the production sector, no 
effect on inequality is found. 
 With only a small number of studies and very mixed results, the question of whether 
aid has an impact on inequality is still unanswered. An important area to explore further is the 
separation of aid into different categories. As long as aggregate aid data is used, research runs 
the risk of capturing several conflicting effects on inequality as only one, overall effect. While 
such research can give valuable insights into the effects that aid of the current composition 
has, it does not necessarily produce results that can provide appropriate guidance for future 
policy decisions. Although Tezanos et al. (2013) and Saidon et al. (2013) have produced 
interesting work in this area, no study has yet used an aid categorization that is prepared 
specifically for the study of the impact of sectoral aid. Another important point is that none of 
the existing studies included aid that is not reported to the OECD/DAC. Research that 
excludes some aid flows runs the risk of overlooking important aspects of aid's impact on 
inequality. Using an aid categorization designed specifically for the purpose and more 
comprehensive aid data therefore has the potential to produce better results, so this study will 
employ both.  
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4. Theory 
 
4.1 Inequality 
Theoretical models generally predict that foreign aid increases inequality, identifying as 
possible reasons self-interested politicians, donor allocation and aid agency incentives, focus 
on economic growth and Dutch disease problems. 
 A common theoretical prediction is that politicians in countries receiving aid will 
spend the money in ways that benefit the powerful elite and the special interest groups that 
support them in elections (Layton & Nielson 2008, Herzer & Nunnenkamp 2012). Since aid 
in this model is spent on the already wealthy, inequality increases. Empiric research indicate 
that the problem of elites using aid for their own objectives occurs regardless of the kind of 
government that is in power (Boone 1996). The fact that aid is a source of government income 
that does not depend on the population's acceptance of the government also means that aid 
can increase the problem of self-interested politicians and further raise inequality (Moore 
2004). With government funding separated from the population, governments are 
hypothesized to have less incentive to listen to what the larger, poorer part of the population 
want (Moore 2004). Svensson (2000) points out that aid might even create an incentive for 
governments to maintain the status quo since lowered poverty is likely to decrease the amount 
of aid the country receives.  
 The politics of aid donors can also cause aid to generate inequality. Since aid is not 
necessarily allocated based on a country's needs (Todaro & Smith 2011, p.700), aid-receiving 
countries might feel a need to spend resources ensuring that they are seen as an attractive 
recipient also in the future (Layton & Nielson 2008, Herzer & Nunnenkamp 2012). Aid might 
therefore be channeled into projects that aim to develop the relationship to the donor country, 
and which are far more likely to benefit the local elite than the poor (Layton & Nielson 2008, 
Herzer & Nunnenkamp 2012). Structural adjustment requirements tied to aid have in the past 
often also meant that recipient countries were forced to implement changes, such as cuts in 
social spending, that are detrimental to the poor (Herzer & Nunnenkamp 2012). Demands 
from taxpayers and politicians in donor countries that aid should produce noticeable 
improvements can also lead to increased inequality (Herzer & Nunnenkamp 2012). Pressure 
to be able to show results can cause aid agencies to focus on easier projects and to take less 
risks, meaning that projects might not reach remote areas or the poorest segments of the 
population (Herzer & Nunnenkamp 2012). 
 The strong focus on aid's effect on economic growth could also cause aid to increase 
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inequality. When growth is in focus, aid is likely to be invested in the most productive sectors 
of the economy (Layton & Nielson 2008). Although growth in these sectors should benefit 
workers as well as owners, the majority of the profits are likely to end up with the latter group 
(Layton & Nielson 2008). A strong focus on growth can thereby lead to increased income 
inequality. 
 Finally, foreign aid can also cause Dutch disease. Inflows of aid can make a country's 
real exchange rate appreciate, which leads to decreased competitiveness of the manufacturing 
sector and increasing unemployment (Bjørnskov 2010). With an increasing share of the 
population in unemployment or forced into subsistence agriculture or the informal sector, 
inequality increases (Bjørnskov 2010). 
 
4.2 Theoretical framework 
A lot of research looks at the determinants of income inequality. In this section, the theory 
behind the most common factors will be discussed, and the empirical research on their effects 
will be reviewed. The discussion aims to provide the theoretical background for the model 
that is developed in the next section.  
 
4.2.1 Economic growth 
One of the factors most commonly assumed to have an effect on income inequality is 
economic growth. The relationship between growth and inequality was analyzed by Kuznets 
(1955) in a widely influential essay. Kuznets hypothesizes that in a country experiencing 
economic growth, income inequality will over time trace out an inverted U-curve. The initial 
increase in inequality is a logical consequence of growth given that only the rich can afford to 
save, that rural income per capita is lower than urban, and that inequality within rural areas is 
lower than inequality within urban areas. Consequently, as farmers and agricultural workers 
move into the new, growing industries in the urban areas, income inequality increases.  
 The increase in inequality will eventually decline and turn into decreasing income 
inequality. Kuznets argues that a number of factors brought on by the economic growth will 
help reduce the buildup of savings among the rich and create this shift of direction, 
identifying as examples increased pressure on the government to reduce inequality as per 
capita GDP grows, technological change making old high-profit firms less profitable than 
newer firms, and higher relative increases in income in manufacturing and service jobs than 
among professionals.  
 Empirical research has produced an inconclusive verdict on Kuznets' inequality 
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hypothesis. About half of the research finds support for the existence of an inverted U-curve 
(e.g. Chen 2007; Bhandari et al. 2010; Mollick 2012), while the other half fail to find the 
expected curve (e.g. Deininger & Squire 1998; Desbordes & Verardi 2012; Huang et al. 
2012).  
 
4.2.2 Globalization 
Globalization is also hypothesized to affect inequality. However, studies that use an aggregate 
globalization measure find very mixed results, with both the existence of an effect in different 
types of countries and its potential sign varying wildly between studies (e.g. Dreher and 
Gaston 2008; Zhou et al. 2011; Ha 2012). The inconclusive results and the multifaceted 
nature of globalization have prompted researchers to attempt to improve the analysis by 
separating the different aspects of globalization. Although a set definition of globalization 
does not exist, the economic aspect of globalization can be said to be about ”increased 
openness of economies to international trade, financial flows, and direct foreign investment” 
(Todaro & Smith 2011 p.565). The empirical investigations of the different globalization 
aspects' effects on inequality have therefore centered on these factors. 
    In standard trade theory, increased economic integration decreases the within-country 
inequality in developing countries. The Heckscher-Ohlin model predicts trade based on 
different factor endowments, where countries specialize in producing goods for which their 
endowment gives a comparative advantage (Todaro & Smith, 2011, p.577). In other words, 
developing countries with an abundant labor supply have access to cheaper labor and 
specialize in labor-intense production. The increased demand for labor in these countries 
drives its price upwards, while the price of capital decreases (Todaro & Smith, 2011, p.580). 
Trade therefore gives rise to a more equal income distribution in developing countries. 
 The Heckscher-Ohlin model does, however, suffer from several limiting assumptions. 
Differences in labor productivity, variations in employment as well as in resource utilization 
and quality, and the effects of political economy elements in trade policy are some of the real 
world circumstances that the model does not take into account (Todaro & Smith, 2011, pp. 
582-583). Including more than two countries or factors of production also makes the model's 
prediction of the effects of increased economic integration less certain (Anderson 2005).  
 Empirical research is also unable to deliver a consensus on the nature of the 
relationship between trade openness and inequality. Studies show that it is unclear whether 
this factor increases, decreases, or has no effect on inequality, and whether the effect differs 
between high- and low-income countries (e.g. Gourdon et al. 2008; Jaumotte 2013; Savvides 
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1998; Meschi 2009). The existing research therefore seems to support the idea that the effect 
of trade openness depends on a country's specific situation (Anderson 2005; Bensidoun et al. 
2011).  
 For FDI5, theoretical models generally predict increased income inequality. An inflow 
of FDI raises the demand for skilled workers and thereby the wages going to this group, so 
greater wage inequality should be expected (Tsai 1995). FDI is also likely to increase the use 
of physical capital in previously labor-intensive production, thereby creating unemployment 
among unskilled workers and even further differences in earnings (Tsai 1995). However, 
some models predict the opposite results. FDI is in this view not different from other capital, 
and will therefore contribute to growth that can benefit everyone in society (Tsai 1995). What 
is important for lowering inequality is, according to this view, not the FDI itself but other 
measures that ensure that the growth FDI generates is made to benefit also the poor (Tsai 
1995). Empirical research on FDI and inequality largely supports the models that predict 
greater inequality (e.g. Jaumotte 2013; Choi 2006; or Clark et al. 2011 for a review; for 
opposing results see for example Franco 2013; Sylwester 2005). 
 
4.2.3 Government intervention 
Government policies can have substantial effects on income inequality. Such policies can be 
divided into four main areas (Todaro & Smith 2011, p.242). The first area of policies 
concerns the returns to factors of production (Todaro & Smith 2011, p.242). If unions or other 
actors drive up (down) workers' wages (physical capital prices) to a level that does not 
correspond to their real market value, government intervention can be needed to bring prices 
back to their optimal level to ensure that labor is not underutilized (Todaro & Smith 2011, 
pp.242-243). The resulting decreases in unemployment should cause reductions in income 
inequality (Todaro & Smith 2011, p.242). However, some economists hold an opposing view 
and argue that keeping wages higher than their market value through the use of minimum 
wages increases the bargaining position of workers in the informal and low-skill sectors 
(Todaro & Smith 2011, p.243). Minimum wages would therefore be beneficial to the poorest 
workers, and would help reduce income inequality (Todaro & Smith 2011, p.243).  
 Asset redistribution is the second area in which government intervention can be used 
to affect inequality. Countries with high income inequality are often also characterized by 
high inequality in assets, so correctly implemented polices that reduce this imbalance can be 
hugely effective in reducing income inequality (Todaro & Smith 2011, p.244).  
                                                          
5 Although other financial flows could affect inequality, the discussion here will be limited to FDI 
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 Governments can also use tax policies to reduce net income inequality. However, a 
common phenomenon is that what looks like a progressive system is in fact regressive when 
taking into account the full amount of taxes that the low and middle income group pay on 
their wages and consumption (Todaro & Smith 2011, p.245). Wealthy people receive more of 
their income from financial or physical assets for which they usually pay low or no tax, and 
are charged relatively little indirect taxes since they consume only a small proportion of their 
income (Todaro & Smith 2011, pp.245-246).  
 Finally, income inequality can be reduced by direct spending or transfers to the poor, 
or through indirect channels such as job creation in the public sector (Todaro & Smith 2011, 
p.242). Such policies do not only reduce inequality through the actual transfer of money; in 
addition, the existence of a safety net can also contribute to less inequality by offering people 
a basic insurance if their business attempts fail, thereby increasing the likelihood that poor 
people dare take on the risk associated with investing in small business endeavors that could 
bring them out of poverty (Todaro & Smith 2011 p 246).  
 Empirical research seems to find support for the idea that the minimum wage reduces 
inequality (e.g. Teulings 2003; Fairris et al. 2008; Silveira Neto & Azzoni 2011), although 
some studies demonstrate that under certain conditions the effect can be low or even positive 
(e.g. Neumark et al. 2006; Wooden et al. 2007; Angel-Urdinola 2008). Research on asset 
redistribution such as microfinance is scarce, but the available studies find reductions in 
poverty and income inequality (e.g. Mahjabeen 2008). Empirical research also supports the 
idea that taxes and transfers reduce income inequality when implemented in an appropriate 
way (e.g. Baer & Fialho Galvão Jr. 2008; Forteza & Rossi 2009; Goñi et al. 2011). 6 
 
4.2.4 Inflation 
Inflation is often brought up as a factor that can affect inequality. Both statistics showing 
higher relative holdings of currency among low-income people as well as evidence of 
inflation being perceived as a higher threat in this group support the hypothesis that inflation 
has a greater negative impact on the poor (Albanesi 2007). Empirical research seems to 
confirm that a positive relationship between income inequality and inflation exists (e.g. 
Beetsma & van der Ploeg 1996; Al-Mahrubi 2000)7. However, in most theoretical models it is 
income inequality that causes inflation through increases in a variety of redistributional 
                                                          
6 For human capital see section 4.2.7 
7 For democracies a consensus seems to have been established; for non-democratic settings some studies with 
conflicting results have been published (e.g. Desai et al. 2005). 
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policies (e.g. Beetsma & van der Ploeg 1996; Dolmas et al. 2000; Albanesi 2007). Although 
many studies do not determine the direction of the causation there seems to exist little 
evidence that contradicts the results of these models. Examinations of whether inflation has 
any effect on income inequality also find no significant effect (Jäntti & Jenkins 2010). 
 
4.2.5 Population size and composition 
Population growth is hypothesized to increase income inequality in developing countries. The 
microeconomic household theory of fertility provides a possible explanation of the process. 
The theory uses neoclassical consumer behavior assumptions and utility optimization 
principles as an explanation of how households determine the number of children to have 
(Todaro & Smith 2011 pp.285-286). Children are seen as a consumption good (or 
investment), whose demand is determined by the cost of having a child, household income, 
and demand for other goods (Todaro & Smith, 2011, pp.286-288).  
 In developing countries, the demand for children can be high among the poor. In very 
poor households, the parents' need for additional income as well as financial security at old 
age can increase the desired number of children (Todaro & Smith, 2011, p.288). In addition, 
the child mortality rate is often higher in regions where poor people live so the number of 
children a household decides to have can be influenced upwards by this (Todaro & Smith, 
2011, p.288). The cost of having children, determined by the mother's forgone wages, is also 
relatively low in poor households where women often have little education and therefore low 
income possibilities (Todaro & Smith, 2011, p. 289). Empirical research on the consequences 
of lowered mortality rates and increased educational opportunities for women show declines 
in fertility rates, thereby lending support to the prediction that the demand and the costs of 
children affect birth rates (Angeles 2010; Buyinza & Hisali 2013; Canning et al. 2013; Malik 
2011). 
 Consequently, based on the microeconomic household theory of fertility, higher than 
average fertility rates can be anticipated among poor people in developing countries. 
Population growth in such countries is therefore expected to consist of a disproportionate 
increase of people in the poorest households, which leads to higher income inequality. 
 Although economic growth can balance out the effect, high population growth can 
increase the demands on an often fixed government budget, thereby reducing the spending per 
capita (Todaro & Smith, 2011, p.296). Such a reduction affects the poor the most, by 
restricting access to health care, education, or other services that help this group increase the 
possibilities of raising their income (Todaro & Smith, 2011, p.296). Population growth could 
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therefore worsen income inequality also in this way.  
 Empirical research generally supports the hypothesis that population growth causes 
greater income inequality (e.g. Gupta & Singh 1984; Ram 1984; Nielsen & Alderson 1995). 
 
4.2.6 Democracy 
The intuitive idea that democracy reduces inequality is popular in the literature (Chong 2004). 
Models that come to this conclusion are often based on mechanisms related to the median 
voter theorem. According to this theorem, politicians need to pay extra attention to the wishes 
of the median voter since meeting the desires of this voter is the key to success in future 
elections (Dictionary of the Social Sciences 2012). In countries with high income inequality 
the median voter will be relatively poor and redistributive measures will be favored 
(Milanovic 2000). Consequently, the political influence of the median voter that comes with 
democracy reduces inequality.  
 Some researchers question whether the relationship between democracy and inequality 
is as straightforward as the median voter theorem suggests. Beitz (1982 cited in Chong 2004) 
argues that inequality is lower in autocracies than in democracies, since the latter system is 
more easily influenced by pressure from wealthier groups. A number of researchers also argue 
that what can be called a political Kuznets curve can exist. In the version of Acemoglu and 
Robinson (2002), increased inequality caused by industrialization can force the political elite 
to act to prevent social unrest, thereby bringing on democratization. In such a situation, 
inequality increases during the industrializing phase but turns downwards as democracy is 
implemented, tracing out an upside-down U as in Kuznets' model.8 
 The empirical research reflects the mixed predictions of the models. Some studies find 
no effect (e.g. Timmons 2010), while others find that democracy causes a reduction in 
inequality (e.g. Reuveny & Li 2003; Huber et al. 2006; Pillai 2011). Support for the political 
Kuznets curve, as well as a possible positive relationship, is also found in a couple of studies 
(Chong 2004; Dreher & Gaston 2008).  
 
4.2.7 Human capital 
Human capital refers to factors that can increase the productivity of a person, such as 
education and good health (Todaro & Smith 2011 p.365). Such factors are often interlinked; 
for example, improved health enables an individual to get more out of their education, while a 
                                                          
8 Acemoglu and Robinson see this pattern as only one of three possible outcomes; low initial inequality could 
instead cause development without increasing inequality or increasing inequality without political reforms. 
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better education renders increased knowledge about how to stay healthy (Todaro & Smith 
2011 p.361). That an increase in human capital decreases inequality seems intuitive, but 
formal models of human capital expansion predict more ambiguous results.9 
 Ram (1989) argues that the early literature on the subject can be separated into three 
different strands: the human capital framework, the dualistic-development paradigm, and the 
job-competition framework. A basic version of the human capital framework was developed 
by Schultz in 1963 (cited in Ram 1989). Schultz argues that inequality in income from 
physical capital is larger than the inequality in income from human capital. Furthermore, 
human capital is assumed to increase faster than physical capital. His model therefore predicts 
that as human capital increases, income inequality decreases. As Ram (1989) points out, this 
basic form of the model does not take into account the possibility that educational expansion 
could increase educational inequality. Ram notes that this is often the case in the least 
developed countries, at least until a higher level of average education is reached. He therefore 
argues that the effects of increased education are unclear; if educational inequality decreases 
as average education rises, the model predicts reduced income inequality, while if educational 
inequality increases, income inequality will increase too. 
 The second strand of the literature, the dualistic-development paradigm, also predicts 
conflicting results. Knight and Sabot (1983) argue that the effect of increasing education 
depends on relative wage levels, the extent of relative wage variation, and the relative size of 
the educated population. As the expansion of education increases the size of the population 
with an education and higher income, income inequality rises. At the same time, the 
increasing supply of educated workers reduces the wages this group is paid, which leads to 
lower inequality between the educated and less educated groups in the population. The overall 
effect of educational expansion on income inequality is therefore unclear also in this model. 
 The job seeker model of Thurow (1975 cited in Ram 1989) provides a less ambiguous 
prediction of the outcome of educational expansion. In this model, increased access to 
education has no effect on income distribution if it is not accompanied by more job 
opportunities. In a situation where the number of jobs stays constant, the educated workers 
will simply replace the uneducated workers, leaving income inequality unchanged. 
 In recent years increased attention has been paid to how the educational system can 
                                                          
9 The following discussion will focus on education, since this factor is frequently used in studies of income 
inequality. An alternative approach employed by many studies is to use an aggregate human capital 
measurement. Special focus on health effects seems to be rare, so a detailed discussion of this factor is not 
provided. 
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restrict the poor’s access to quality education, and thereby can help to maintain or even 
increase inequality (Todaro and Smith 2011 p. 385). This argument is discussed in detail in 
Gruber and Kosack's (2013) study of the effects of increasing primary enrollment. They 
demonstrate that in developing countries, rising primary enrollment rates increases inequality 
in the following decade. Gruber and Kosack find the explanation in what they call the tertiary 
tilt, or the emphasis on investment in tertiary rather than primary education - a common 
phenomenon in developing countries. They argue that a tertiary tilt reduces the returns of 
primary education in several ways. Without adequate focus on enabling students to continue 
into secondary and tertiary education, the result of rising enrollment rates is an increasing 
supply of primary educated workers that drives wages down in this group. In addition, 
governments focused on tertiary education are unlikely to be able to increase spending in 
primary education when the number of pupils increases, so a decrease in the quality of 
education is likely. Consequently, even new students can be worse off if they are sacrificing 
time learning a trade for low-quality schooling.  
 The frequent use of tuition fees at the secondary level further restricts the poor's access 
to good education (Todaro and Smith 2011 p. 385). The fact that many governments fully 
fund university education, where most student come from wealthier homes, further helps to 
increase future income inequality (Todaro & Smith 2011 p. 385). 
 Although many theoretical frameworks predict increased inequality due to the 
educational system and its expansion, empirical research on the subject find more positive 
results. While some contradicting research exists, the majority of the studies find a negative 
relationship between educational expansion and income inequality (e.g. Park 1996; Li et al. 
1998; Sylwester 2002). 
 
4.2.8 Corruption 
Institutional quality and corruption are also factors that can affect income inequality. 
According to Jain (2001), corruption can be defined as ”the power of public office...used for 
personal gain in a manner that contravenes the rules of the game”. Institutional quality, on the 
other hand, is a broader concept focused on the standard of a state's institutions, which 
encompassed corruption. Both institutional quality and corruption are generally hypothesized 
to increase income inequality. 
 There are several channels through which corruption can increase income inequality. 
Corruption can cause a climate of uncertainty that is likely to reduce investments among the 
poor and middle-income earners (Gupta 2002). While the wealthy often have political power 
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or connections that help them avoid a great part of the uncertainty, poorer people that lack 
such connections will face higher risks and risk premiums on their investments (Gupta 2002).
 Tax evasion or exemptions can also lead to a reduction in the resources available for 
social programs (Andres & Ramlogan-Dobson 2011). This hypothesis is supported by 
empirical research that demonstrates that corruption reduces government spending on 
education (Mauro 1998). Since access to tax experts and ways to avoid paying taxes are more 
readily available to the wealthy, the consequence of this type of corruption can also be a 
heavier tax burden on the less wealthy population, which in effect makes the tax system 
progressive (Andres & Ramlogan-Dobson 2011).  
 Corruption can also divert government spending into areas that benefit the wealthy 
population, or into areas where bribes are easier extracted (Gupta et al. 2002). In addition, 
corruption can negatively affect the quality of government services and lead to unnecessary 
expenditures if contracts are awarded based on connections rather than based on efficiency 
and skills (Rose-Ackerman 1996). 
 Empirical research shows somewhat mixed results but generally supports the notion 
that corruption increases income inequality (e.g. Gupta et al. 2002; Gyimah-Brempong & 
Munoz de Camacho 2006). The exception is research on Latin America, where a negative 
relationship between corruption and income inequality seems to exist (e.g. Dobson & 
Ramlogan-Dobson 2010; Andres & Ramlogan-Dobson 2011). A few researchers also find 
evidence indicating that the inequality that corruption causes could itself lead to more 
corruption, leading to a vicious circle of increasing inequality and corruption (Jong-Sung & 
Khagram 2005).  
 
4.2.9 Economic dualism 
In a development context, economic dualism is a concept relating to the sectoral division of 
an economy into a traditional and a modern part (A Dictionary of Sociology)10. In one strand 
of the literature it is strongly connected to the process of increasing income inequality 
resulting from the shift of workers into the modern sector and the wage differential between 
the two sectors (Nielsen & Alderson 1995), as first discussed by Kuznets (1955). Measures of 
economic dualism based on this view, especially the percentage of the population employed 
in agriculture, are often included in analyses of the determinants of income inequality. The 
                                                          
10 Generally, the traditional sector is equal to the country's agricultural sector while the modern sector refers to 
industrial production. 
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results are mixed, and negative but rarely significant relationships between agricultural 
employment and inequality are common (Layton & Nielson 2008; Shafiullah 2011), although 
a positive relationship has also been observed (Tsai 1995). 
 The appropriateness of including these variables is questioned by researchers such as 
Bourguignon and Morrisson (1998). Bourguignon and Morrisson argue that the rural-urban 
wage differential and the proportion of labor in the two sectors are endogenous, and 
consequently not suitable as explanatory variables. Instead, they develop a model focused on 
comparative advantage of agricultural production where the relative endowment of land 
suitable for agriculture, the distribution of that land, and the relative labor productivity (the 
ratio of agriculture to modern sector productivity) are important determinants of inequality. 
 Bourguignon and Morrisson base their model on a general equilibrium framework for 
a developing country open for trade, where all income is distributed to the production factors. 
In such a situation, total income and its distribution is determined by the country's factor 
endowment as well as the ownership distribution of the production factors. Sectoral allocation 
of workers and the rural-urban wage differential, which is caused by differences in skill or 
production factor ownership between the two areas, must then be determined by the general 
equilibrium and its determinants. Consequently, relative endowment of land suitable for 
agriculture, and its distribution, are the determinants of income differences. 
 Bourguignon and Morrisson then extend the model to account for dualistic labor 
markets with artificially high wages in the modern sector, which are generally assumed 
common in developing countries. In the full model, income inequality therefore depends on 
the relative endowment of agricultural land and its distribution, as well as a measure of the 
depth of the dualism, which Bourguignon and Morrisson demonstrate can be proxied by 
relative labor productivity in agriculture. Since the relative labor productivity does not show a 
strong correlation with the rural-urban income differential, the model avoids the use of 
endogenous factors as explanatory variables while still taking into account the dualistic nature 
of many developing economies. 
 In accordance with the predictions, Bourguignon and Morrisson's empirical research 
shows that agricultural land per capita, the share of such land cultivated by small or medium 
sized farmers, and relative labor productivity all have a negative effect on income inequality. 
The results are not only strongly significant, but also robust to changes in the model.  
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5. Model 
In this study a model based largely on the work of Bjørnskov (2010) is used. However, the 
study differs from Bjørnskov's in that the primary interest is not the interaction of democracy 
and aid, and their impact on inequality, but how different types of aid affect inequality. 
Consequently, some modifications of the model are needed. Each statistically valid aid 
category will be added as an explanatory variable, and democracy will be considered a normal 
control variable. Also, in contrast to Bjørnskov (2010), the dependent variable used in the 
study is the Gini coefficient, and some additional changes of control variables are also done. 
 The study uses panel data, so the general regression model has the format: 
      Giniit = β1 + β2AidVit + β3Xit + uit  for i=1,...,N and t=1,...,T,  (1) 
where Giniit is the Gini coefficient, β1 is the basic intercept, AidVit is the set of aid variables, 
Xit is a set of control variables and uit is the error term, which might include time and 
individual-specific effects. The subset it indicates that each term is for a country (i) in a 
certain year (t). 
 The set of aid variables contains both current and lagged variables. Since aid is 
divided into four categories, four variables capturing the amount of aid received in the current 
time period in each of the aid categories are included in the set. These variables capture aid's 
short-term effect on inequality. In addition, the effect of lagged variables from each aid 
category is tested. If aid is invested in projects that aim to produce benefits in the longer run, 
it could take several years for the effect of aid to be noticeable. The inclusion of lagged aid 
variables makes it possible to capture such long-term effects. Taking both current and lagged 
aid variables into account, the full aid variable set has the following format: 
     AidVit = (δ1Aid1it + δ2Aid2it + … + δNAid4it ) + (δ1,it-1Aid1it-1 + δ2,it-1Aid2it-1 + …  
 + δN,it-1Aid4it-1) + … + (δ1,it-nAid1it-n + δ2,it-nAid2it-n + … + δN,it-nAid4it-n)  (2) 
where δ is a certain aid category's effect on inequality and n is the number of lags. 
 The set of control variables includes a number of the factors described as determinants 
of income inequality in the previous theoretical discussion. By incorporating these factors into 
the model as explanatory variables, their effects can be separated from effects caused by 
foreign aid. Variables for FDI, population growth, and the dependency ratio11 are therefore 
included in the complete model. The coefficient signs of these variables should be positive.  
 Trade openness, the proportion of the population living in rural areas, and the 
                                                          
11 The dependency ratio, or the number of people in the population not of working age divided by the number of 
people who are of working age, is somewhat related to population growth but can potentially provide further 
insights. 
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investment price level are also control variables in the complete model. For trade openness, 
both theory and empiric investigations provide mixed answers on the nature of the effect, so 
the expected sign is unclear. The variable measuring the proportion of the population living in 
rural areas is included based on Bjørnskov's (2010) arguments that consumption in such areas 
is underestimated due to the difficulties of counting non-traded goods. The anticipated sign of 
the variable is therefore positive.  
 Bjørnskov (2010) also suggests that economic dualism can be captured by the 
investment price level. The argument is based on standard economic theory which dictates 
that firms, in their strive to maximize profit, try to lower the cost of production. If relative 
capital prices are low, firms will attempt to replace the labor used in the production process 
with capital whenever possible (Stone, 2008, p. 289). Rising demand for capital drives the 
price of this factor upwards, thereby increasing its return and the inequality between workers 
and capital owners. Hence, the expected sign of the variable is negative. Bjørnskov argues 
that using the investment price level is a better option in developing countries where data on 
endowments or sectoral composition often is wanting and of varying quality. This study 
follows his recommendation on this point.  
 Variables for a second type of inequality determining factors are also included in the 
complete model. This type of variables differ from the previously discussed control variables 
in that the effect of foreign aid might work through them, so that the variables' inclusion in the 
model makes aid's actual effect on inequality difficult to observe. Government intervention, in 
this study proxied by government consumption, is one of the most prominent of these factors. 
If aid affects inequality by increasing government intervention in areas that impact inequality, 
the inclusion of a variable that captures the effects of government intervention will render the 
coefficient of the aid variable insignificant. However, the theoretical and empirical 
discussions suggest that government intervention might also independently affect inequality, 
so the factor is added to the complete model. The coefficient for government intervention is 
expected to be negative.  
In a similar way, GDP might capture the effects of economic aid and render this 
variable insignificant in the regressions. However, since GDP by itself should be an important 
determinant of inequality, it must also be left in the model. Based on theoretical 
considerations, GDP is converted into the natural logarithm of GDP per capita. Also the 
square of the logarithmized GDP is included in the model. The logarithm is used to account 
for the fact that the effects of increases in GDP are likely to decline as GDP grows while the 
squared term is included due to the expected inverted U-shape of the Kuznets curve; this term 
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solves the problem of nonlinearity (Bourguignon & Morrison 1998; Bjørnskov 2010). 
Consequently, GDP is expected to have a positive sign while its square should have a 
negative sign.  
 Democracy is the only other factor used in this study that could potentially belong to 
the same type of factors as government intervention and GDP. Foreign aid has often got a 
democracy enhancing purpose (see for example USAID 2014; Utrikesdepartementet 2014), 
and the theoretical and empirical discussion in the previous section showed that democracy 
generally has an effect on inequality, although the sign of the effect varies. The hypothesis 
that aid could work through democracy is partly supported by research that indicates that aid 
has either a negative effect, or no effect at all, on democracy (see the meta-study by Askarov 
& Doucouliagos, 2013). The inclusion of democracy in the model could therefore affect the 
significance of the aid variables. 
 Three frequently used factors in research on aid and inequality will not be included in 
the model. Since education is largely funded by government spending, its effects on inequality 
should be captured by the government intervention variable. A separate variable for 
educational attainment is therefore not included. Also inflation will be excluded, due to the 
theoretical and empirical indications that inflation is determined by, rather than being a 
determinant of, income inequality. Due to a combination of low availability of data and a need 
to keep the number of variables in the model as few as possible, corruption is also not used as 
a control variable in the study. 
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6. Data 
 
6.1 Income inequality data 
The Gini coefficient variable is from The Standardized World Income Inequality Database 
(SWIID), Version 4.0 (Solt 2013a). SWIID is a standardization of income inequality data 
from several extensive data sets12, with the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) used as the 
baseline (Solt 2009). Consequently, the main advantage of the SWIID is that is makes 
inequality comparable over longer time and across more countries than with other datasets, 
while still incorporating as much information as possible from the highly rated LIS study 
(Solt 2009).  
 The fact that the SWIID estimates missing data, and therefore partly is based on 
estimations, can be seen as a weakness of the data set. However, the calculations of the 
missing data employs several techniques, such as an emphasis on proximate observations and 
Monte Carlo simulations, to avoid problems associated with less elaborate estimation methods 
(Solt 2009). The negative effects of estimating data should therefore be minimized and 
outweighed by the advantages of a more comprehensive dataset. The suitability of the SWIID 
is further demonstrated by its generally low standard errors, as well as the fact that it shows a 
better correlation to life expectancy and child mortality than other data (Solt 2009). In the 
data, gross and net incomes are also more correlated in developing countries than in 
developed, which is consistent with expectations since redistributional policies are less 
common in the former countries (Solt 2009).  
 The SWIID data set uses a Gini measure that ranges from 0 to 100, and the coefficient 
is available based on gross and net figures. Since aid goes through the government and could 
potentially be used for direct transfers, this study uses the net Gini coefficient.  
 
6.2 Foreign aid data 
Most research on aid uses data from the World Bank and OECD/DAC. In this study a 
different approach is taken, and the data on aid flows comes from AidData, a collaboration 
between the College of William & Mary, Brigham Young University, and Development 
Gateway (Tierney et al. 2011). The advantage of this data set is that is takes a broader view of 
                                                          
12 The sources for the income inequality data includes the United Nations University's World Income Inequality 
Database version 2.0c, the OECD's Income Distribution Database, CEDLAS and the World Bank's Socio-
Economic Database for Latin America and the Caribbean, Eurostat, the World Bank's PovcalNet, the UN's 
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, the World Top Incomes Database and national 
statistical offices (Solt 2013b). 
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aid than DAC's ODA data. AidData includes ODA, but also incorporates aid from other 
donors, collected through annual reports, project web pages or direct requests (Tierney et al. 
2011). Aid from DAC members that falls outside of the ODA definition, as well as past aid 
flows removed from DAC's data since the recipient no longer is considered a developing 
county, are also included in AidData's data sets (Tierney et al. 2011; AidData n.d.). The data 
set also contains purpose codes for all aid posts (Tierney et al. 2011). The classification 
follows OECD's purpose code system, but includes a number of additional codes and also 
attempts to capture information on the activity level (Tierney et al. 2011).  
 Although AidData provides more comprehensive data on aid, the data set is far from 
complete. A recurrent problem is the inability of some donors to provide information for more 
than a few data fields (Tierney et al. 2011). The problem of incomplete data is especially 
persistent in earlier years since donors that only recently started to report their aid flows to 
AidData often are unable to provide data for the years preceding their first report (Tierney et 
al. 2011). 
 This study uses disbursement figures in constant 2009 US dollars from version 2.1 of 
the AidData Research Release. All aid going to regional or unspecified recipients were 
removed from the file. In addition, since AidData reports aid figures on a project level, all 
project aid for a country in a certain year has been added together. For years in which a 
country had an aid value of zero registered, a value of zero rather than null (no data) was 
recorded. The data was then separated into categories based on a classification developed by 
Bjørnskov (2013) (see Appendix B.3.). Bjørnskov (2013) argues that principal factor analysis 
can be used to separate aid into statistically valid categories that will help avoid problems of 
multicollinearity. His analysis, based on the 24 purpose codes in the 1970-2005 data, finds 
four such categories: economic aid, social aid, reconstruction aid, and a smaller residual 
group. Consequently, separating aid into these four categories will yield better estimates of 
the effects of different types of aid than can be achieved with an arbitrary classification where 
correlations between aid categories are likely to occur. A correlation table over the four 
categories using the data of this study shows that the highest correlation, between social and 
reconstructional aid, is still rather high at 65%. However, the rest of the categories all have 
correlations below 45%, with the majority being around 30%. 
 Finally, the aid data was converted into percentage of GDP, in accordance with 
standard practice in the field. Although the effect of aid could possibly decline as aid as a 
proportion of GDP increases, logarithmizing of the aid variables was avoided to prevent 
issues due to the many values of zero that these variables contain.  
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6.3 Control variables data 
Data for the control variables come from the Penn World Tables (PWT), the World Bank's 
World Development Index (WDI) and the Polity IV project. Details on the variables used and 
their modifications can be found in Table 1.  
  
6.4 Data preparation  
The raw data file contains 32 countries that are classified as high-income countries by the 
World Bank (World Bank n.d.c). The way aid is used in such countries is likely to differ from  
its use in developing countries, so the focus of the study is limited to the latter type of  
 
Table 1. Regression variables (before detrending) 
 Variable Name Source Definition Format 
Gini coefficient gini SWIID Net equivalized household income 1 to 100 
Aid economic aidEc AidData Aid for economic purposes, as classified by AidData purpose codes. (1) Percent of GDP 
Aid social aidSoc AidData Aid for social purposes, as classified by AidData purpose codes  (1) Percent of GDP 
Aid 
reconstruction 
aidRec AidData Aid for reconstruction purposes, as classified by AidData purpose codes  
(1) 
Percent of GDP 
Aid residual aidRes AidData Residual aid, as classified by AidData purpose codes  (1) Percent of GDP 
Log GDP per 
capita; log GDP 
per capita 
squared 
GDP; 
GDPsq 
PWT From RGDPNA, a variable for real GDP in constant 2005 USD (in mil.). 
RGDPNA is based on a 2005 benchmark study and calculated for the rest 
of the years from national account growth rates (Feenstra et al. 2013a). 
“GDP” and “GDPsq” are calculated as RGDPNA divided by the 
population size variable, logarithmized (and squared). ln (real GDP / 
population size);[ln (real GDP / population size)]^2 
Log of GDP; log 
of squared GDP 
Trade openness trade PWT Measured as trade as a share of GDP; the share of goods import variable 
plus the share of goods exports variable: (share of imports + share of 
exports). Multiplied by 100 to convert into percentages. 
Percent of GDP 
Government 
intervention 
gov PWT Government consumption as a share of output-based GDP in purchasing 
power parity (PPP) rates, multiplied by 100 to convert into percentages. 
Percent of GDP 
Population 
growth* 
pop PWT Yearly rate of change over the trend, calculated based on the population 
size variable. Note: variable is detrended, see section 7.2 for details 
Percent 
Investment price 
level 
inv PWT Measured as Price level of the capital stock variable, with the US 2005 
figure as base year. Multiplied by 100 to convert into percentages. 
Percent 
FDI fdi WDI Net inflows of capital purchasing 10% or more of stock in a firm in the 
country, divided by GDP. (2) 
Percent of GDP 
Population 
living in rural 
areas 
rur WDI Estimates by the WB's staff based on the UN's World Urbanization 
Prospects; definitions of what constitutes rural population from national 
statistical offices. (3) 
Percent of total 
population 
Dependency 
ratio 
dep WDI Dependent population (aged under 15 or over 64) divided by working age 
population (aged 15-64). Estimates by the WB's staff based on data from 
the UN, national statistics offices, household surveys and ICF 
International (4) 
Percent of 
working age 
population 
Democracy dem Polity 
IV 
Democ variable. Measured as a composite of "competitiveness of political 
participation...the openness and competitiveness of executive 
recruitment…and constraints on the chief executive”, on the 31st of 
December of the year in question. (5) ** 
0 to 10 (higher 
values indicate 
higher 
democracy) 
          
The table lists all variables used in the regression analysis together with their source and definition, before detrending (see section 7.2). 
Sources: The Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID) by Solt (2013a); AidData by Tierny et al. (2011); Penn World Tables 
(PWT) by Feenstra et al. (2013b); the World Bank's World Development Indicators (WDI), see below; Polity IV by Marshall et al. (2013). 
Notes: (1) Based on Bjørnskov's (2013) classification. (2) The World Bank n.d.c. (3) The World Bank n.d.d. (4) The World Bank n.d.b. (5) 
Marshall et al. 2013.  
*Detrended variable **The variable was cleaned from values representing political interruption (e.g. foreign occupation), state collapse or 
transition periods before a new regime, in accordance with methods already in use for other variables in the dataset. Interruption is coded as a 
missing value, state collapse as a zero and transition period scores are approximated using linear interpolation (as per Marshall et al. 2013).   
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countries. All 14 countries that have been classified as high income since 1987, or since they 
were first classified, are therefore removed from the file (World Bank n.d.a). To avoid 
excluding any countries that successfully used their aid for development purposes, all 
countries that went from a lower classification to becoming a high-income country during the 
period 1987-2011 are included in the analysis. Twelve countries for which the World Bank 
had no income classification were also removed from the file.13 
 Due to the scarcity of data from developing countries, all variables used in the study 
are averaged over four year periods (as per Bjørnskov 2010). Averaging the variables also 
helps to avoid having the results affected by business cycles, measurements errors or noise 
(Bjørnskov 2010). Despite this adjustment, data for the years 1960-1971 is still very scarce, so 
these years are not included in the analysis. All countries with Gini coefficient for only two or 
fewer years are also excluded. After removing such countries, 126 countries for the time 
period 1972-2011 are left in the data. Two of these countries have aid data for less than two of 
the time periods in which they have a Gini coefficient and are therefore removed too. Another 
8 countries have no GDP information, which makes it impossible to convert their aid into a 
percentage so these countries are also removed, leaving a total of 116 countries for 1972-2011 
in the data.  
 Since many countries have neither Gini nor aid figures for every year, the panel is 
unbalanced. Although an unbalanced panel can cause some methodological complications, the 
major problem with such panels – a bias in which data is missing - should not be a serious 
problem in this study. In general, aid is allocated to all developing countries and should not 
exclude any particular kind of country. A potential relationship between missing Gini 
coefficient data and a certain type of country, such as countries with governments paying little 
attention to social problems or with lower income, could exist but are likely have a small, if 
any, effect. 
 Although most of the control variables are almost universally filled for the panel years, 
FDI data is only available for around half to two thirds of the countries in the first three time 
periods. Consequently, when FDI is added to the model, the number of observations included 
in the regression for the first periods will drop substantially.
                                                          
13 Of these, all but Taiwan are also missing too much data on aid disbursements and Gini coefficients to be 
included in the study. Taiwan received aid only during three years, and is therefore excluded as well. 
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7. Method 
 
7.1 Panel analysis 
This study uses panel data analysis to investigate the relationship between foreign aid and 
inequality. Panel analysis provides several advantages, in particular when working with a 
large number of countries. With this type of analysis the effects of omitted variables can be 
captured, making it possible to avoid biased or inefficient estimates due to unobserved 
heterogeneity between countries (Dougherty 2011, p.514). For research on developing 
countries, where differences in country characteristics can be large, this feature is especially 
useful. In a similar manner, panel data also provides the possibility to capture time-specific 
effects, to ensure that differences over time do not cause biased or inefficient estimates.  
 The combination of time and cross country data also means that panel data has a high 
number of observations (Dougherty 2011, p.515), thereby ensuring higher degrees of freedom 
for analyses. As a result, the probability distribution of the random variable becomes closer to 
a normal distribution, so more precise estimates are obtained (Dougherty 2011, p.48). In 
addition, panel data analysis makes it possible to gain information on the dynamics of the 
studied variables and the characteristics of a country that cannot be gained with only time or 
cross country data (Dougherty 2011, p.514-515). Consequently, although the use of a panel 
can complicate the regression analysis in some aspects, the method also provides several 
advantages that will be beneficial to the study.  
 
7.2 Data examination 
Before the actual regression analysis takes place, careful examination of the data is necessary. 
Linear regression relies on a number of assumptions about the regression model and its 
components, and violations of these assumptions can cause biased, inefficient and inconsistent 
estimates, as well as invalid standard errors (Dougherty 2011, e.g. pp.306-310; 331). If the 
data is found to contradict any of the assumptions it indicates that the actual variable included 
in the regression model also violates this assumption. An awareness of such violations makes 
it possible to adapt the variables or the model, and provides greater understanding of the 
potential problems with the regression estimates in cases where an appropriate adaptation is 
impossible. A thorough analysis of the data to identify any incompatibilities with the 
assumptions is therefore crucial.  
 Multicollinearity is a sign of violations of the linear regression assumption that the 
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independent variables are not exactly linear (Dougherty 2011, p.300). An indication of 
problematic levels of multicollinearity in a regression are high coefficients of determination 
(R²) combined with insignificant t-statistics (Dougherty 2011, p.105, p.179). Correlations 
between independent variables can be used to anticipate possible multicollinearity in simpler 
models, but in regressions with three or more independent variables multicollinearity can be a 
problem even when no such correlation exists (Dougherty 2011, p.165, 168). The main 
method employed in this study to avoid incorrect conclusions due to multicollinearity is 
therefore examinations of the regression results. 
 For regressions on time series data, special care needs to be taken to meet the 
assumption that all data is stationary (Dougherty 2011, p.463). Signs of non-stationarity are 
generally visible on a simple graph of a variable over time. However, two types of non-
stationarity exists so for this study a panel unit root test of the Fisher-type, using an 
augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test, was used to determine whether stationarity can be 
achieved through differencing or through a removal of the trend (Dougherty 2011, pp.473-
474, 489). To determine the type of ADF test needed, graphs of each variable over time were 
examined for time trends (as per Dougherty 2011, pp.490-491). On theoretical grounds, 
several variables can be expected to be non-stationary. As Table 2 displays, the graphs and  
Table 2. Fisher-Type augmented Dickey Fuller unit root test for panel data 
  
Theoretical 
expectation 
Graphical 
representation 
ADF test, probability 
of random walk             
(diff. station.): 
Type of 
variable 
ADF test, probability 
of random walk with 
drift (diff. station. 
with trend): 
Detrending 
method Variable 
Aid Ec Stationary No clear trend 0.0000* Stationary - - 
Aid Soc Stationary No clear trend 0.0005* Stationary - - 
Aid Rec Stationary No clear trend 0.0000* Stationary - - 
Aid Res Stationary No clear trend 0.0000* Stationary - - 
lnGDP Non-stationary Trend - Non-stationary 0.0156 trend 
Trade Non-stationary No clear trend 1.0000 Non-stationary - difference 
Pop Non-stationary Trend - Non-stationary 0.0000 trend 
Rural Non-stationary Trend - Non-stationary 0.0000 trend 
Invest Unclear No clear trend 1.00000 Non-stationary - difference 
Gov Unclear No clear trend 0.06520 Non-stationary - difference 
FDI Non-stationary No clear trend 0.00000 Stationary - - 
Dep Non-stationary Trend - Non-stationary 0.0000 trend 
Dem Stationary No clear trend 0.00000 Stationary - - 
Gini Stationary No clear trend 0.00000 Stationary - - 
      
  
The table displays the results of a Fisher-type augmented Dickey Fuller panel test on yearly data for the time period 1972-2011 for all 
116 countries included in the study. Automatic lag length was used for the random walk test while zero lag length was used for the 
random walk with drift test. 
*Due to the format of the aid data, a unit root test was conducted only on 4 year averages over the time period 1972-2011 
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tests confirm the expectations in all but one case. Only FDI, which could be expected to 
increase as developing economies grow, is in fact stationary. The results also demonstrate that 
the dependent variable is stationary, so cointegration between this variable and the 
independent variables can be ruled out (Dougherty 2011, p504-505). To achieve stationarity, 
all non-stationary variables are detrended in the way deemed appropriate by the tests. 
 An additional assumption of linear regression is that a linear relationship exists 
between the dependent and independent variables (Dougherty 2011, p.192). However, when 
more than one explanatory variable is included in the regression, simple scatter plots produce 
an incorrect overview of the relationship due to the effects of excluded variables that are 
correlated with the independent variable (Dougherty 2011, p.156) Partial regression plots – 
scatterplots of the purged dependent and independent variables – are therefore necessary for 
investigations of linearity as well as outliers when working with multiple regressions 
(Dougherty 2011, p.195, 156; Fox 1991, pp.36-38, 55). An analysis of the data with the help 
of partial-regression plots shows a mixture of patterns, ranging from almost evenly spread out 
data points to possible linearity. Unfortunately, the low number of time periods in the panel 
does not seem to provide enough data to detect possible trends and outliers. Since linearity 
between the dependent variable and the regressors is one of the most important assumptions 
of linear regression, the inability to properly examine this assumption and correct for 
violations could potentially have serious consequences. Awareness of this shortcoming is 
important when analyzing the regression results.14 
 Linear regression models also assume that the independent variables are not correlated 
with the disturbance term in any observation (Dougherty 2011, p.301). This assumption will 
be violated if the independent variable suffers from measurement errors, or if a simultaneous 
equation bias exists. Both measurement errors and simulation equation bias can be addressed 
with the help of instruments (Dougherty 2011, pp.306-307, p.316, p.333, p.338). Since aid 
figures are difficult to measure and inequality could affect the amount of aid that a country 
                                                          
14 One additional remark must be made concerning linearity. Since the dependent variable in the study, the Gini 
coefficient, by definition is a proportion and only can take values between 0 and 1 (adjusted to 0 and 100 in 
this study), the effect of the independent variables cannot be constant unless their ranges are very restricted 
(Papke & Wooldridge, 1996). Consequently, in surveys such as this one, the relationship between the 
dependent and most independent variables must be nonlinear so linear regression is likely to forecast values 
that are outside of the dependent variable's range (Grace-Martin, NA; Papke & Wooldridge, 1996). However, 
if all values of the dependent variable are relatively far from its bounds, all data should be on the linear part 
of the curve and a linear regression can be used to model the data (Grace-Martin, NA). Since only 9 out of 
1151 observations of the Gini coefficient are below the recommended 0.2 minimum limit (most of these are 
also very close to this limit) and none are above the 0.8 maximum, the use of linear regression should be 
acceptable in this case. 
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receives15, measurement errors and simulation equation bias could be present in the study. 
Some justification for the use of instruments therefore seems to exist. However, the use of 
instruments in a panel data setting complicates the analysis considerably. Finding appropriate 
instruments is also a difficult task, especially when working with panel data (Bjørnskov 
2010). Consequently, to simplify the analysis, the impact of simultaneous equation bias and 
measurement errors is assumed to be limited, and the study does not use any instruments. 
 
7.3 Regression method 
With data analysis completed, a Durbin Wu Hausman test was conducted to determine 
whether fixed effects (FE) or random effects (RE) should be used in the regression (see Table 
3 and Table 4 below) (Dougherty 2011, pp.520-521). The redundant fixed effect test rejects 
the null hypothesis of no effect for both cross section and period, as well as for the combined 
statistic. The test thereby confirms that both cross section and period effects should be used in 
the study. In the test for correlated random effects the null hypothesis of no effect between FE 
and RE fails to be rejected. Since RE is the most efficient method of the two, the test indicates 
that RE should be used for the cross section. RE cannot, however, be used as period effect in 
the full regression model since the number of regressors is higher than the number of time 
periods. In addition, FE cannot be used in combination with RE in an unbalanced data set in 
the statistical software used for the analysis (EViews). The solution will be to run two 
versions of the regression, testing the model first with only cross section RE and then with 
both cross section and period FE. 
 
7.4 Residual examination 
Some of the assumptions of linear regression models cannot be examined by looking at the 
raw data but requires analyses of residuals from a regression. If the assumption of an identical 
probability distribution, and therefore also identical variance, of the disturbance term for each  
 
Table 3. Redundant Fixed Effects Tests 
 
Table 4. Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test 
Effects Test 
Statisti
c   d.f.  Prob.  
 
Test 
Summary 
Chi-Sq. 
Statistic 
Chi-Sq. 
d.f. Prob.  
Cross-section F 13.1780 (111, 524) 0.0000 
 
Cross-section 
random 19.5214 14 0.1460 
Period F 5.6789 (8, 524) 0.0000 
     Cross-
Section/Period F 13.1418 (119, 524) 0.0000 
                                                               
15 Research shows that the level of a country's deprivation, for which inequality might be an influencing factor, 
affects aid allocation (Feeny & McGillivray 2008; Hoeffler & Outram 2011). 
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of the observations is violated, heteroscedasticity exists (Dougherty 2011, p.280). Tests for 
heteroscedasticity on panel data are complex and absence of the phenomenon in cases such as 
for this study, where the sample consists of countries of different sizes, is unlikely. 
Heteroscedasticity is therefore assumed to be present in this study, so robust standard errors 
are used to correct for this issue.  
 Another assumption of the linear regression model that requires an analysis of the 
residuals is the expectation that the disturbance term is uncorrelated between observations 
(Dougherty 2011, p.429). Since this study uses panel data, autocorrelation could be a problem 
in the time dimension. However, as the data has been averaged over 4 year periods, the risk is 
somewhat reduced. The formal test of autocorrelation in panel data developed by Wooldridge 
is used to test the data used in the study (Drukker 2003; IHS Global Inc. 2013, pp.772-773). 
Both the test using FE and RE reject the null hypothesis of no serial correlation (see Appendix 
A.2). Standard errors robust to autocorrelation in the time dimension should therefore be used. 
Since cross section serial correlation is rare, and no special reason to suspect it in this study 
exists, tests for correlation between countries' disturbance terms have not been conducted. 
 Both heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation are addressed with White period robust 
standard errors. This method corrects for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation in the error 
terms of a country (cross-section clustered) (IHS Global Inc. 2013 p.731).16  
 Linear regression also assumes that the disturbance term is a random variable with a 
normal distribution (Dougherty 2011, p.114). The assumption can be tested by checking 
whether the residuals are normally distributed. Smaller deviations from normality do not 
generally pose any problem, but a very non-normal distribution can cause problems with F- 
and t-tests, as well as p-values (Montgomery et al. 2010, p.136). Although strictly speaking 
only valid for very large samples, the Jarque-Bera test will be used to evaluate the normality 
of the residuals of the regressions run in the study (Mukherjee et al. 2013, p.95). 
 
7.5 Regression approach 
One final note on the methodology used is needed. To better be able to follow the effect that 
the control variables have on aid, these variables will be added to the regression one at a time. 
A review of the impact of additional control variables is included in the discussion of the 
results.  
                                                          
16 Using Period SUR (PCSE) robust standard errors causes only minor changes. Period SUR (PCSE) corrects for 
country heteroscedasticity and serial correlation as well as cross-section correlation but places extra 
assumptions on the model and is therefore not used as the default for the study (Chen et al. 2010; IHS Global 
Inc. 2013, p.732). 
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8. Results 
 
8.1 Random effects 
According to the Durbin Wu Hausman test, RE is the preferred method for the study. 
However, since the number of regressors is higher than the number of time periods, period RE 
cannot be used so regressions are run with only cross section RE. As control variables are 
added to the regressions, the coefficient of determination increases from 2% to 14.5%. A 
coefficient of determination of 14.5% implies that the regression explains only a smaller 
proportion of the variation in the dependent variable. However, the fact that the F-tests of the 
regressions are significant indicates that the model still has explanatory power (Dougherty 
2011, p.178). All regressions are also showing normally distributed residuals, indicating that 
tests should be reliable. 
 Signs on the control variables are all as expected, with the exception of FDI that 
remains negative throughout all regressions, and trade that changes between negative and 
positive values. However, the null hypothesis of no effect from trade or FDI cannot be 
rejected so the unexpected signs seem to be due to random fluctuations.  
 With the test statistics and signs of the control variables showing no particular reasons 
for concern, focus can be shifted to the variables of interest. Current economic and social aid 
both have positive signs on their coefficients. These results support the theoretical predictions 
that aid increases inequality. The first lags of these two variables are not significant and are 
therefore removed from the model. The results for reconstructional and residual aid are more 
interesting; both current and first lagged residual as well as lagged reconstructional aid 
variables have negative signs, indicating that increased aid of these types decreases inequality. 
As control variables are added to the model, the signs of the aid variables remain the same.  
 Several control variables do, however, affect the size and significance of the aid 
variables. As the dependency ratio is added to the model, the magnitude of economic aid 
decreases with around 14%, while reconstructional and residual aid increase with around 16% 
and 3% respectively. Coefficients for social aid, lagged reconstructional aid and lagged 
residual aid all change in size with approximately 10%, the latter growing while the two 
former decrease. Adding GDP causes coefficients to increase with a bit more than 10% for 
economic aid and 30%-50% for social aid, and to decrease with a bit more than 15% for 
residual aid. Coefficients for lagged reconstructional and residual aid both decrease less than 
5%.  
 The addition of democracy has a rather large effect on all current aid variables. The 
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coefficient of economic aid decreases with 25%-30% while social aid and reconstructional aid 
increase with around 16% and 13% respectively. Residual aid decreases with less than 5%. 
FDI causes the coefficient for economic aid to increase with around 10%-20%, while residual 
aid’s coefficient increases with around 10% for both current and lagged aid. The lagged 
reconstructional aid’s coefficient decreases with around 20%. 
 The regression output for the complete model can be found in Table 5. The table 
shows that neither social nor reconstructional aid have any effect on inequality. However, the 
first lag of reconstructional aid is significant. Also economic aid and current and lagged 
residual aid are significant (the lagged variable only at 10%). 
 The regression estimates of the coefficients show the effect that an increase of a one 
percentage point of aid, measured as a percentage of GDP17, will have on the Gini coefficient. 
A look at the coefficient of lagged reconstructional aid shows that a one percentage point  
 
Table 5. Regression output of complete model with RE 
Periods included: 9 
 
Cross-sections included: 112 
 Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 628 
   Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C 41.5415 0.8863 46.8688 0.0000 
AIDEC 2.0078 0.7280 2.7579 0.0060*** 
AIDSOC 0.6492 0.5293 1.2266 0.2205 
AIDREC -0.7981 0.7814 -1.0214 0.3075 
AIDRES -8.5605 3.1847 -2.6880 0.0074*** 
LNGDP 26.1031 10.4474 2.4985 0.0127** 
LNGDPSQ -1.2770 0.6202 -2.0590 0.0399** 
TRADE 0.0353 0.5308 0.0665 0.9470 
POP 0.0071 0.0025 2.8555 0.0044*** 
RUR -0.0655 0.0416 -1.5744 0.1159 
INV -0.2158 0.7630 -0.2829 0.7774 
GOV -3.0287 1.0632 -2.8487 0.0045*** 
FDI -0.0563 0.0847 -0.6645 0.5067 
DEP 0.1975 0.0460 4.2961 0.0000*** 
DEM 0.1867 0.1178 1.5846 0.1136 
AIDREC(-1) -5.5919 1.7511 -3.1934 0.0015*** 
AIDRES(-1) -5.4652 2.8925 -1.8895 0.0593* 
R-squared 0.1456 F-statistic 6.5056 
 Adjusted R-squared 0.1232 Prob(F-stat.) 0.0000 
 
*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1 
                                                          
17 For clarity, written simply as ”aid” for the remainder of the section. 
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increase in this type of aid in the previous 4-year period causes inequality to decrease with 
5.59 Gini coefficient units in this 4-year period if all else is held constant.18 The coefficient 
for economic aid indicates that, holding all else equal, a one percentage point increase in 
economic aid in the current time period increases the Gini coefficient with 2.01 units. For 
residual aid, a one percentage point increase in the current period causes the Gini coefficient 
to decrease with 8.56 units, while a one percentage point increase in the previous 4-year 
period causes a decrease of 5.46 Gini coefficient units in the current period, ceteris paribus. 
 Among the control variables, a smaller number of variables are significant. Both GDP 
and its square belong in this group. Since GDP has been detrended and is both logarithmized 
and nonlinear, the interpretation of its coefficient is less straightforward and its effect varies 
with GDP (see Appendix A.3). Consequently, a 1 million USD increase of GDP over its trend 
causes a 26.1031/GDPit – [2.5540*ln(GDPit)]/GDPit increase in the Gini coefficient. 
Government intervention is also significant with a coefficient that indicates that a one 
percentage point increase in intervention19 causes the Gini coefficient to decrease with 0.0320 
units. Significant p-values exist for two more variables: the dependency ratio and population 
growth. Their coefficients show that a one percentage point increase over the dependency 
ratio trend causes inequality to increase with 0.20 Gini coefficient units, while a one 
percentage point increase over the population trend causes a 0.01 increase of the Gini 
coefficient. 
 Theoretically, a longer delay in the effects of aid is possible. Running the regression 
with more than one lag could therefore reveal more about aid's impact on inequality and 
potentially also improve the goodness of fit of the model. Adding additional lags makes 
residual aid significant in both the second and the third lags. The inclusion of the extra lags 
has a substantial impact on a number of other variables, most notably making economic aid 
insignificant, and investment and social aid significant (the latter at 10% level). The 
coefficient of determination is slightly higher at 15.4%. Running the regression without 
variables for current aid has little effect - lagged reconstructional and residual are still the only 
significant variables but the coefficient of determination decreases to 12.7%. 
 
8.2 Fixed effects 
To be able to conduct regressions with period specific effects as well as country effects, the 
                                                          
18 In accordance with standard practice, Gini coefficients are rounded to the closest second decimal. 
19 Government intervention is proxied by government consumption, calculated as a percentage of GDP. 
20 All variables that are detrended using differencing are in decimal rather than percentage form, so a one 
percentage point increase in government intervention causes a β2/100 increase in the Gini coefficient. 
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FE approach is used for both dimensions. As before, control variables are added one by one to 
the basic model of income inequality regressed on lagged and current aid. All regressions 
have coefficients of determination of 78%-80% but since the coefficient is calculated based 
on differences between the complete FE model and a model with a common intercept, the 
high value is likely due to significant country and/or time effects (Eviews support 2012).  
All F-tests of the regressions are significant. Jarque-Bera tests show that none of the 
regressions using FE have a normal distribution of the residuals. Since the assumption of a 
normal distribution is one of the least important assumptions of linear regression unless the 
data is used to make predictions for particular data points, indications of non-normality should 
not be a serious problem (Gelman 2013). Signs on all control variables are as expected; only 
rural population has coefficients that varies between negative and positive values. Since this 
variable is insignificant, the negative values are likely random occurrences.  
 Focusing on the variables of interest shows that the signs on the aid variable 
coefficients are identical to the RE regressions: economic and social aid have positive signs 
and current and lagged reconstruction and residual aid have negative signs. Lagged economic 
and social aid are again not significant and are therefore removed from the model.  
 As certain control variables are added, some larger changes in the size of the 
coefficients and significance of the aid variables can be observed. When GDP is added to the 
model, coefficients for both economic and social aid increase with around 20%-40% while 
reconstructional aid's coefficient increases with less than 5%. Adding FDI also affects a 
number of aid variables. Current and residual aid coefficients increase with around 10% and 
15% respectively, while economic aid increases with 15%-30%. Both current and lagged 
reconstructional aid's coefficients decrease with around 15%.  
 Government intervention is another influential variable. The coefficients of residual 
and social aid increase with around 15% and less than 5% respectively, and coefficients of 
both reconstructional and residual lagged aid decrease with around 10% when government 
intervention is added to the model. Finally, democracy and the dependency ratio each affect 
one aid variable strongly. When democracy is added to the model, economic aid's coefficient 
decreases with about 30%. The dependency ratio causes reconstructional aid's coefficient to 
grow with about 10%. 
 The regression output for the complete model can be found in Table 6. Current 
reconstructional aid is the only aid variable that is not significant. However, the first lag of 
this variable is significant. Economic, social and current as well as lagged residual aid are all 
significant only at the 10% level. The regression coefficients show that for each one 
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percentage point increase in aid21 to reconstructional purposes in the previous 4-year period, 
inequality decreases with 4.43 Gini coefficient units in this period, ceteris paribus. A one 
percentage point increase in economic aid causes inequality to increase with 1.93 units on the 
Gini index, while a one percentage point increase of aid going to the social category increases 
inequality with 1.03 units on the Gini index, ceteris paribus. For aid to the residual category, a 
one percentage point increase of aid while holding all else constant decreases inequality with 
5.94 units on the Gini index. Finally, a one percentage point increase in lagged residual aid in 
the previous 4-year period causes inequality to decrease with 4.42 Gini coefficient units in 
this period, ceteris paribus. 
 Among the control variables, only GDP, democracy and government intervention are 
significant. The square of GDP is insignificant, indicating an absence of Kuznets inverted U-
shaped curve, and a linear effect of GDP. Since GDP has been logarithmized, the coefficient  
 
Table 6. Regression output of complete model with FE 
Periods included: 9 
 
Cross-sections included: 112 
 Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 628 
   WARNING: estimated coefficient covariance matrix is of reduced rank 
 Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C 41.0061 0.8162 50.2375 0.0000 
AIDEC 1.9334 0.9873 1.9581 0.0508* 
AIDSOC 1.0284 0.5469 1.8805 0.0606* 
AIDREC -1.4859 1.2563 -1.1827 0.2375 
AIDRES -5.9427 3.3689 -1.7640 0.0784* 
LNGDP 21.9348 11.1230 1.9720 0.0492** 
LNGDPSQ -1.0097 0.6774 -1.4906 0.1367 
TRADE -0.3172 0.7265 -0.4367 0.6625 
POP 0.0167 0.0148 1.1324 0.2580 
RUR -0.0369 0.1125 -0.3281 0.7430 
INV -0.5466 0.7921 -0.6901 0.4905 
GOV -3.8212 1.1401 -3.3517 0.0009*** 
FDI 0.0199 0.0880 0.2262 0.8212 
DEP 0.1047 0.0664 1.5765 0.1156 
DEM 0.3812 0.1740 2.1903 0.0290** 
AIDREC(-1) -4.4348 2.2542 -1.9674 0.0497** 
AIDRES(-1) -4.4215 2.5415 -1.7397 0.0825* 
R-squared 0.8013 F-statistic 14.7000 
 Adjusted R-squared 0.7468 Prob(F-stat.) 0.0000 
 
*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1 
                                                          
21 As in the previous section, aid is measured as a percentage of GDP but will for clarity be written simply as 
”aid” for the remainder of this section. 
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of 21.9347 means that holding all else equal, a 1 million USD increase in GDP causes a 
21.9347/GDPit unit increase of the Gini coefficient (see Appendix A.4.). The coefficients also 
show that a one-unit increase in the Polity IV measure of democracy increases the Gini 
coefficient with 0.38, while a one percentage point increase in government intervention would 
cause a decrease of 0.0422 units on the Gini index, ceteris paribus.  
 Regressions with more lags were also tested, but no additional significant variables 
were found. When estimating the regression without current aid, lagged reconstructional and 
residual aid remain the only significant variables (the latter only at the 10% level). 
                                                          
22 All variables that are detrended using differencing are in decimal rather than percentage form, so a one 
percentage point increase in government intervention causes a β2/100 increase in the Gini coefficient. 
 42 
9. Conclusion 
Despite strong indications that inequality can have adverse effects on development, 
surprisingly few studies have investigated the relationship between aid and inequality. The 
results from the existing research are mixed, and only a couple of studies look at whether the 
intended use of aid makes any difference on the relationship to inequality. The purpose of this 
study is to help bring clarity to the question of whether foreign aid, and in particular different 
types of it, affects inequality. The aid data used in the study is therefore separated into four 
statistically valid categories - economic, social, reconstructional and residual - based on its 
intended use. The results from FE and RE regressions on a panel data of 116 countries over 
the period 1972-2011 show that a relationship exists between all types of aid and inequality.  
 Economic and social aid both have a positive relationships to inequality. The results 
therefore support the theoretical models that predict that aid will increase inequality. The 
results are, however, somewhat weak. Although economic aid is significant at 1% in the RE 
regression, both variables are only significant at 10% in the more reliable FE model. 
Theoretically, these two variables are likely to affect inequality through GDP and 
governmental intervention, which reduces the visibility of their effects in a regression 
analysis. GDP and governmental intervention are also significant in both the RE and FE 
regressions, so the weak effect of economic and social aid could be a result of the fact that 
these control variables are included in the model.  
 The results for reconstructional and residual aid are more unexpected. Contrary to 
what the theoretical models predict for overall aid, these variables exhibit a negative 
relationship to inequality (with the exception of current reconstructional aid which is 
insignificant). It is important to point out at this point that no test of the direction of the effect 
has been conducted. Although the regression model implicitly implies that aid causes 
inequality, it is possible that the effect goes the opposite way. Aid could be allocated 
primarily to the countries that suffer greater inequality, due to an association with poverty. 
The following paragraphs will generally assume that inequality is the dependent variable, but 
it is important to be aware that causality could run from inequality to aid.  
 The fact that reconstructional aid is not significant until in the first lag is less of a 
surprise when looking at the composition of this type of aid. The main components of 
reconstructional aid are emergency response and reconstruction relief. Projects in these areas 
can generally be expected to be large and time consuming, but should have a substantial effect 
on a society once finished. At the same time, such projects are more likely to be a one-off 
occurrence or to be conducted for a limited time period only, so the apparent lack of 
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significance of the variable in further lags is not unexpected.  
 The negative relationship between residual aid and inequality is particularly 
interesting, especially since the results suggest that the effect of this type of aid might persist 
for more than a decade. Although the scope of this study does not provide any basis for 
drawing conclusions as to why aid affects inequality, it is interesting to note that all aid aimed 
specifically at projects for women is included in the residual category. Studies show that 
women's situation are a likely determinant of their children's future situation, so investments 
in women have large possibilities to affect future generations (Todaro & Smith 2011, p.240). 
The long effect of residual aid would fit well with processes such as this. 
  Some caution must, however, be observed when evaluating results from regressions 
with several lags. An important disadvantage of using many lags in an unbalanced panel is the 
often large decrease in the number of observations available for the regression. For an 
unbalanced panel with as few time periods as this one (10), the effect of using 3 lags will be 
considerable. The results from the model with several lags should therefore be considered 
preliminary. 
  A couple of concerns about the quality of the regression results should also be 
addressed. A surprising result in the study is the lack of significance of so many of the control 
variables. Even though the theoretical discussion demonstrates that there are valid reasons for 
including the variables, regressions show that only three (five) variables are significant in the 
FE (RE) regression. However, although they are not significant, virtually all control variables 
have the expected signs. 
 A more serious problem is the fact that linearity could not be tested. Violations of the 
linearity assumption can cause coefficient estimates to be incorrect, so the failure to test this 
assumption means that the results of the study must be seen as tentative. Future studies will 
hopefully have access to more comprehensive data, especially in the time dimension, so that 
more reliable results can be produced. Alternatively, a replication of the study using more 
complex econometric methods that can account for possible nonlinearity would be welcome. 
 In short, the results of the study suggest that all types of aid have a relationship to 
inequality, and that the purpose of the aid matters. If the causation indeed runs from aid to 
inequality, the study findings indicate that aid should be focused on projects belonging in the 
residual aid category if inequality is to be lowered. Also projects that address emergencies or 
reconstruction needs are helpful in decreasing inequality, although the effect seems to be 
more temporary.  
 
 44 
Appendix A 
A.1 Fisher-Type Augmented Dickey Fuller Unit Root Test for Panel Data 
A non-stationary variable can have both an autoregressive component as well as a time trend, 
so the complete possible model is:  
Yt = β1 +β2*Yt-1 + β3*t + ut 
(Dougherty 2011, pp.489-490). If no trend is visible in a plot of a variable over time, only two 
options are possible, a stationary process or a random walk: 
Yt = β1 +β2*Yt-1 + ut 
Yt = Yt-1 + ut 
(Dougherty 2011, p.491). Assuming absence of a trend, a Fisher-type augmented Dickey 
Fuller (ADF) unit root test for panel data on a model without a trend will determine whether 
non-stationarity in the shape of a random walk exists (β2 = 1 or β2 < 1). The Fisher ADF test 
allows individual unit root processes for each cross section and combines these into an overall 
panel result (IHS Global Inc. 2013, p. 492).  
 If a trend is visible in the plot of a variable over time, the two possible models are a 
random walk with drift or a deterministic trend  
Yt = β1 + Yt-1 + ut 
Yt = β1 +β2*Yt-1 + β3*t + ut 
(Dougherty 2011, p.497). A Fisher-type ADF unit root test on a model with a trend and an 
intercept can then determine which kind of stationarity exists in the data (β2 = 1 or β2 < 1). 
Whether β3 = 1 or β3 ≠ 0 follows as a consequence of the unit root's existence or not.  
 
 
A.2 Wooldridge’s panel test for autocorrelation 
The following discussion is based on Drukker (2003). In the basic panel regression model, 
Giniit = αi + β1 + β2Xit + uit,  
where Giniit is the Gini coefficient, αi is individual specific effects, β1 is the basic intercept, Xit 
is a set of regressors and uit is the error term.  
 By taking first differences, only the dependent and independent variables as well as 
the error term are left in the model: 
Giniit - Giniit-1 = αi + β1 + β2Xit + uit – (αi + β1 + β2Xit-1 + uit-1) 
ΔGiniit = Δβ2Xit + Δuit 
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Regressing this model gives residuals, resit, that are the sample values for the error term Δuit. 
Wooldridge points out that if no serial correlation between error terms exist,                      
Corr (Δuit, Δuit-1) = -0.5. Consequently, regressing resit on resit-1 produces a coefficient that is 
Corr (Δuit, Δuit-1), and a simple F-test can be used to determine whether the value differs from 
-0.5. 
 For the tests in this study, p-values of 0.0000 demonstrate that the null hypothesis of 
no autocorrelation can be rejected even at 1%. 
 
Table A.1. Wooldridge's autocorrelation test 
(RE) 
 
Table A.2. Wooldridge's autocorrelation test 
(FE) 
Test Stats. Value df Probability 
 
Test Stats. Value df Probability 
F-statistic 302.7683 (1, 426) 0.0000 
 
F-statistic 184.5823 (1, 426) 0.0000 
         Null Hypothesis: C(1)=-0.5 
 
Null Hypothesis: C(1)=-0.5 
        
 
        
Residuals are from a regression model using RE. 
 
Residuals are from a regression model using FE. 
 
 
A.3 Marginal effect of the nonlinear variable GDP 
A variable’s marginal effect is the derivative of the regression model (Dougherty 2011, 
p.209). Consequently, for a nonlinear and logarithmized variable such as GDP, the marginal 
effect is: 
Giniit = β1 + β2AidVit + β3Xit + β4*[ln(GDPit )] + β5*[ln(GDP)]²it  + uit   
∂ Giniit / ∂ GDPit = β4 / GDPit  + [2*β5*ln(GDPit)]/ GDPit 
 
In this particular case, the marginal effect is therefore: 
∂ Giniit / ∂ GDPit = 26.1031 / GDPit  + [2*(-1.2770)*ln(GDPit)] / GDPit  
∂ Giniit / ∂ GDPit = 26.1031 / GDPit – [2.5540*ln(GDPit)] / GDPit 
 
 
A.4 Marginal effect of GDP in FE regression 
Again, a variable’s marginal effect is the derivative of the regression model (Dougherty 2011, 
p.209). With the complete model, 
Giniit = β1 + β2AidVit + β3Xit + β4*[ln(GDPit )] + uit, 
the derivative becomes: 
∂ Giniit / ∂ GDPit = β4 / (GDPit ) 
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Appendix B 
Table B.1. Countries in study 
Angola Cote D'Ivoire Honduras Lithuania Pakistan Tajikistan 
Albania Cameroon Croatia Latvia Panama Turkmenistan 
Argentina Colombia Hungary Morocco Peru Trinidad and Tobago 
Armenia Comoros Indonesia Moldova Philippines Tunisia 
Azerbaijan Cape Verde India Madagascar Poland Turkey 
Burundi Costa Rica Iran Maldives Paraguay Tanzania 
Benin Djibouti Iraq Mexico Romania Uganda 
Burkina Faso Dominican Republic Jamaica Macedonia FYR Russia Ukraine 
Bangladesh Ecuador Jordan Mali Rwanda Uruguay 
Bulgaria Egypt Kazakhstan Montenegro Senegal Uzbekistan 
Bosnia-Herzegovina Estonia Kenya Mongolia Sierra Leone Venezuela 
Belarus Ethiopia Kyrgyz Republic Mozambique El Salvador Vietnam 
Belize Fiji Cambodia Mauritania Serbia Yemen 
Bolivia Gabon Korea Mauritius Suriname South Africa 
Brazil Georgia Laos Malawi Slovak Republic Zambia 
Barbados Ghana Lebanon Malaysia Swaziland Zimbabwe 
Bhutan Guinea Liberia Namibia Syria 
 Botswana Gambia St. Lucia Niger Chad 
 Chile Guinea-Bissau Sri Lanka Nigeria Togo 
 China Guatemala Lesotho Nepal Thailand 
  
 
Table B.2. Previous research on aid's effect on inequality 
Study Effect of aid on inequality 
No. 
countries; 
time period 
Method Primary aid measure; data source aid 
Inequality 
measure Data source inequality 
Cuesta et al. 
2006 
Negative if given 
during a longer period, 
regional variations of 
the strength of the 
effect exists 
30; 1995-
1998 
Ordered probit Aid per capita; annual 
variation; World Bank 
(OECD) 
Gini 
coefficient, 
interval ratings 
Living Standards 
Measurement Study of 
the World Bank; United 
Nations University's 
World Income 
Inequality Database, 
WIID, v 1.0 
Chong et al. 
2009 
No effect; when taking 
the quality of 
institutions into 
account, aid reduces 
inequality but the effect 
is not robust 
116; 1971–
2002 
Fixed effects 
dynamic panel 
data 
Generalized 
Method of 
Moments 
(GMM) 
Percentage of GDP; 
ODA disbursement and 
commitments, OECD; 
Effective Development 
assistance (EDA), 
Chang et al. 1999 
(World Bank) 
Gini coefficient United Nations 
University's World 
Income Inequality 
Database, WIID 
Layton & 
Nielson 2009 
No effect; positive 
effect in many cases 
but few are significant 
and robust  
82; 1975-
2005 
Fixed and 
random effects 
Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) 
and Two Stage 
Least Squares 
(2SLS) 
Log of aid per capita; 
World Development 
Indicators, WDI, World 
Bank (OECD) 
Gini coefficient University of Texas 
Inequality Project 
Bjørnskov 
2010 
Positive relationship of 
aid and inequality in 
democracies; no effect 
in autocracies 
88; 1960-
2000 
Random 
effects 
weighted least 
squares (WLS) 
Log of percent of GDP; 
ODA, OECD 
Shares of the 
population 
belonging to 
each of the five 
income 
quintiles 
United Nations 
University's World 
Income Inequality 
Database, WIID 
Shafiullah 
2011 
Negative effect; unclear 
effect in South Asia 
94; 1989-
2008 
Fixed and 
random effects 
regressions 
Net aid growth rate; 
ODA, World Bank 
(OECD) 
Gini coefficient Standardized World 
Income Inequality 
Database, SWIID 
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Table B.2. Previous research on aid's effect on inequality (cont.) 
Study Effect of aid on inequality 
No. 
countries; 
time period 
Method Primary aid measure; data source aid 
Inequality 
measure Data source inequality 
Herzer & 
Nunnenkamp 
2012 
Positive effect 21; 1970–
1995 
Panel 
cointegration 
on a bivariate 
model 
Percentage of GDP; Net 
Aid Transfers (NAT), 
Center for Global 
Development 
Gini coefficient University of Texas 
Inequality Project 
Saidon et al. 
2013 
Aid to the economic 
sector has a negative 
effect, aid to the multi-
sector has a positive 
effect, aid to the social 
and production sectors 
has no effect 
75; 1995-
2009 
Generalized 
Method of 
Moments 
(GMM) 
Log of percentage of 
GDP; ODA, OECD 
Gini coefficient Standardized World 
Income Inequality 
Database, SWIID 
Tezanos et 
al. 2013 
Latin America & the 
Caribbean: Negative 
effect; grants have 
smaller effects than 
loans 
20; 1992-
2007 
Growth model 
estimated with 
Generalized 
Method of 
Moments 
(GMM) 
Net disbursement; 
percentage of GDP; 
ODA, OECD 
Growth rate of 
GDP per capita 
of the 
population in 
the nine poorest 
deciles 
United Nation's 
Economic Commission 
for Latin America 
(ECLA)  
 
 
Table B.3. Categorization of aid 
  Percentage of aid in AidData's purpose code assigned to 
  
Economic 
purposes 
Social 
purposes 
Reconstruction 
purposes 
Residual 
group 
Agriculture, forestry and fishery 64 36 
  Banking and financial services  
   
100 
Business and other services  
 
100 
  Communications 100 
   Development aid, food security assistance 100 
   Disaster prevention and preparedness 
   
100 
Education 44 56 
  Emergency response 
  
100 
 Energy generation and supply 100 
   General budget support 
 
100 
  General environmental protection 
 
100 
  Government and civil society 
 
52 48 
 Health 33 67 
  Industry, mining, construction 100 
   Other 
 
100 
  Other commodity assistance 100 
   Other social infrastructure and services 
 
100 
  Population policies / Programs and 
reproductive health 
 
55 
 
45 
Reconstruction relief 
  
100 
 Support to NGOs and government 
organizations 
   
100 
Trade and tourism 
   
100 
Transport and storage 100 
   Water supply and sanitation 62 38 
  Women 
   
100 
     The table displays how much of aid in each of AidData's purpose codes is classified into each of the four statistically valid aid 
categories that Bjørnskov (2013) developed.  
The following purpose codes are excluded from the analysis since aid classified into these codes does not meet all the criteria of 
being grants going to a specific developing country for aid purposes that are not humanitarian: Action relating to debt, 
Humanitarian aid, Administrative costs of donors, Refugees in donor countries, Unallocated / unspecified 
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